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In today‟s financial geography, Wall Street intersects Main Street.  When it comes to sound bites, 
politicians recognize that ordinary Americans feel the effects of plummeting financial markets in their 
retirement savings.
1
  But, when the discussion turns to reforming financial services regulation, the 
reformers forget that much of the money that greases the cogs of Wall Street comes from dedicated 
retirement savings accounts, such as 401(k) accounts.   
The continuing turmoil in the financial services sector almost certainly will result in regulatory 
reform.
2
  Numerous commentators and policy makers have blamed deregulation, lack of federal oversight, 
fragmentation of agency authority, or some similar regulatory failing for allowing the growth in subprime 
mortgages, credit default swaps, and other financial products that have contributed to the financial crisis.
3
  
Even during continuing economic instability, the new Presidential administration has stated that 
regulatory reform is a high priority.
4
   
 In March 2008, Secretary of the Treasury Henry M. Paulson, Jr. set out an aggressive proposal, 
The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
 5
 (Blueprint), 
for the reorganization of regulatory authority over the financial services industry.  The Blueprint‟s 
publication date shortly followed the near bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, which was one of the early events 
to rattle US financial markets and challenge regulators to intervene aggressively.
6
  The proposal, though, 
was not a hastily compiled reaction to the Bear Stearns situation or to the later and more widespread 
financial instability in the US markets.  In March 2007 Treasury had convened a conference on the 
competitiveness of US capital markets.
7
  Following the conference, Treasury initiated a study on how 
other countries allocate authority over financial services and sought comments on potential reform.
8
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As a result of that year-long effort, the Blueprint proposes sweeping revision of the regulatory 
structure used to oversee the institutions at the heart of the US financial system, such as investment banks, 
commercial banks, and insurers, as well as the operation of stock markets.
9
  Its approach would in the 
long term, among other things, increase the authority of the Treasury Department, decrease the authority 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and create new regulatory agencies.
10
  Though 
primarily focused on the allocation of authority among regulators, the proposal embeds significant 
substantive regulatory change by, for example, for the first time subjecting investment vehicles such as 
hedge funds to federal oversight.
11
   
Regulatory approaches, such as that of the Blueprint, which assume investor funds are 
interchangeable amalgamations of assets, fail to recognize and react to the way in which current 
regulation differs in its applicability based on the source of the funds.  The terms are defined more 
extensively below,
12
 but this article uses “retirement-specific accounts” to refer to dedicated, tax-favored 
retirement savings vehicles, which wrap around investor assets and enable the accounts to receive 
favorable tax treatment.  In benefits terminology, these are typically referred to as defined benefit (DB) or 
defined contribution (DC) plans,
13
 and even more specifically as 401(k) plans, employee stock ownership 
plans, and so forth.  The specialized benefits terminology, however, may be counterproductive where the 
focus should be, as it is here, on the assets held inside the benefits plan accounts and how the regulation 
of those accounts compares to regulation of non-retirement plan retail investment accounts such as 
brokerage accounts.  To facilitate the discussion I use the „accounts‟ terminology, modified as 
appropriate, to refer to the various types of vehicles that hold investment assets.  This terminology also 
eases the discussion of international approaches to the regulation of retirement wealth accumulation since 
each country tends to use a unique terminology to refer to its retirement-specific programs.
14
  In contrast 
to retirement-specific accounts, “generalized investment accounts,” as used in this article, encompasses 
the broad universe of nonspecialized savings vehicles, such as bank savings accounts, brokerage accounts, 
and other retail investment vehicles that do not receive tax incentives intended to stimulate asset 
accumulation for retirement. 
 The Blueprint concludes that Australia‟s regulatory structure for oversight of its financial 
services industry and markets provides the closest model to what would be the optimal structure for the 
US.
15
  Australia uses an objectives-based approach to financial services regulation.  That approach 
requires establishing a few key objectives and assigning a regulator to each objective.
16
  Another 
regulatory model, known as the single consolidated regulator approach, has been adopted by the United 
Kingdom (UK)
17
 and praised by commentators on the basis of its efficiency, effectiveness, and 
predictability.
18
   
Australia and the UK each made significant changes in their retirement income systems within a 
few years of undertaking reform of regulation over their financial services sectors.  Both countries 
addressed the interdependency of stable financial markets and healthy private-sector mechanisms that 
provide retirement income by giving financial services industry regulators some authority over aspects of 
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retirement-specific accounts. This is not to say that the path chosen by either Australia or the UK is the 
appropriate model for US regulation.   Their approaches, however, help to show how the seemingly 
different worlds of financial services and retirement savings are now intrinsically linked and provide a 
basis to establish principles to guide US reform efforts.  
Even before the most recent instability in the financial markets, the overlapping nature of 
retirement-specific investment accounts and other retail investment accounts in the US had increasingly 
blurred the boundaries between the authority of the SEC and Department of Labor (DOL).  For example, 
after the Enron and other corporate scandals in the early part of the century, courts struggled to rationalize 
a DOL supervised disclosure regime for retirement-specific accounts, which arguably required earlier and 
more extensive disclosure to employee-shareholders than to non-employee shareholders, with the SEC‟s 
insider trading provisions, which would seem to prohibit the more extensive disclosures.
19
  Not only did 
the colliding regulations potentially put fiduciaries in a position where they would be forced to violate one 
of the requirements, the DOL‟s resolution of the conflict essentially gave it power to nullify the long 
tradition of securities law enabling companies to remain silent between required disclosure periods.
20
   In 
another example of overlap, recently the SEC and DOL each issued separate regulatory proposals 
detailing requirements for disclosure of investment account fees and costs.
21
  The DOL‟s regime applies 
to retirement-specific accounts while the SEC‟s regime applies to some, but not all, types of generalized 
investment accounts.  From an overall perspective, the regulatory overlaps have become so extensive that 
in July 2008, the SEC and DOL entered into a formal Memorandum of Understanding (2008 MOU) in 
order to clarify the division of authority over retirement specific accounts.
22
   
 To date the reform proposals and literature have focused on either the financial system and 
securities side of regulatory reform
23
 or on the pensions side.
24
 In this article I argue that the two 
perspectives should be merged.  Although the complexity of each of the areas has no doubt contributed to 
the paucity of literature merging the two, US reform of regulation over the financial services industry 
must take into account the trillions of dollars held by Americans in retirement-specific accounts.
25
  A 
financial oversight structure that fails to recognize that some assets are held in retirement-specific 
accounts would create negative externalities on disclosures and other information flows.  It would fall 
short of maximizing application of the insights of researchers in the fields of behavioral finance and 
behavioral economics.  And it would create inefficiencies as entities could exploit regulatory differences 
between the formal retirement savings regime and the regulation of other investment vehicles to the 
detriment of investors.   
Part II begins by examining the importance to the US financial system of assets held in 
retirement-specific accounts.  It also analyzes the role of those assets in contributing to retirement income 
security.  The Part concludes by explaining the fragmented approach taken by the US to regulating the 
relationship between the financial services industry and retail investors. It shows how that approach 
depends on the nature of the account used to facilitate investment.  Part III explains the paradigm shift 
that has taken place in the basic nature of retirement-specific accounts.  That shift changed the nature of 
the risks associated with the assets held in retirement-specific accounts.  The current legislative approach 
was targeted at mitigating the risks of the prior paradigm. 
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Part IV considers the allocation of regulatory responsibility over retirement-specific accounts and 
compares it to the regulation of generalized investment accounts. Although changes in the basic structure 
of retirement-specific accounts have decreased many of the differences between those accounts and 
generalized investment accounts, neither the substantive regulation nor the assignment of regulatory 
authority has changed.   The Part undertakes an operational analysis of the risk in retirement-specific 
accounts, which reveals specific types of problems that have arisen in these accounts.   
Part V argues that reform of financial services industry oversight must recognize the attributes 
and regulation of retirement-specific accounts.  To ignore this sector of investment would further entrench 
overlapping regulation, disregard the substantive risks to individual investors, and endanger the use of 
tools intended to maximize the accumulation of wealth for retirement support.  In conclusion the Part 
discusses competing principles that must be balanced as reform moves forward.  It suggests that a 
different balance may be struck for product-level regulation than for account-level regulation.  
Throughout the article, the approaches used by the UK and Australia are used to inform the discussion 
and analysis.   
 
II. The Role and Regulation of Retirement-Specific Accounts in the US Financial System 
This Part considers the importance of retirement-specific assets to the US financial system and to the 
individuals who rely on those assets for retirement security.  The Part ends by describing how the current 
regulation of the relationships between financial services firms and investors differentiates based on 
whether assets are held in retirement-specific accounts or in generalized investment accounts. 
 
A. Deployment of Assets   
In the US, assets designated as formal retirement savings exceeded $17.6 trillion in 2007.
26
  
Seventy-one percent of households in the US reported in 2007 that they had an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA),
27
 an employer-sponsored retirement plan or both.
28
  Almost two-thirds of those assets are 
held in accounts that are formatted as workplace (employer-sponsored) employee benefit plans.
29
   
An important indicator of the importance of retirement assets to a national economy is the size of 
those assets compared to the size of the economy.  As of year-end 2006, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) data indicates that the percentage of US pension fund assets 
relative to the size of the US economy was 73.7 percent.
30
 Another indicator of the importance of 
retirement savings is the comparison of retirement-specific assets to market capitalization of US 
companies.   The $17.6 trillion held as formal retirement savings compares to $25.1 trillion, which was 
the worldwide market capitalization of operating companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) as of 2006 year end.
31
   
 The $17.6 trillion held as formal retirement savings in the US can also be compared to the 
division of assets among various financial sectors.  At year end 2006 the assets held by US insurers 
totaled $6 trillion.
32




 Not surprisingly, retirement assets have not been immune to the economic downturn.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated losses of retirement assets at one trillion dollars through the 
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second quarter of 2008.
34
  Estimates taking into account losses later in 2008 put the decline in retirement 
assets at a minimum of two trillion dollars.
35
 
 According to OECD data, the percentages of retirement assets to the size of the national 
economy were slightly higher in the UK and much higher in Australia, with 77.1 percent and 94.3 percent 
respectively.
36
  Estimates indicate that, among all of the major Asia-Pacific countries, Australia will 
continue to have the largest value of pension assets under management at least through 2015.
37
  Almost 
fifty percent of total Australian pension account assets are invested in equity securities of Australian 
companies.
38
   
While the amounts invested are important because of the proportion and volume of the assets, 
investments made through retirement accounts also have an effect on the financial products offered by the 
financial services industry.  Assets invested through retirement-specific accounts where the investors 
make their own investment choices have changed the market, and marketing, for retail investment 
products.  In 1990 only eight percent of long-term mutual fund holdings were held in the type of 
retirement-specific accounts known as defined contribution (DC) plans.
39
  By 2007 that percentage 
tripled, to twenty-four percent.
40
  Decision-making on investments in those accounts is typically the 
responsibility of the individual account holders.  Thus, pension trends mean that mutual funds 
increasingly must recognize and target the individual investor market.  As a comparison, institutions, 
including financial institutions, not-for-profit companies and other institutional investors, held fourteen 
percent of mutual fund assets in 2007.
41
  Acknowledgement of the scope of overall retirement assets 
invested in mutual funds would require knowing the extent to which those institutional investors were 
investing other types of plan assets, most specifically defined benefit plan assets.   
Less quantitative measures of the importance of retirement savings to the US economy and the 
financial services industry were evidenced in legislation passed as the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 
2006.
42
  PPA amended prior law to permit hedge funds to receive more investments from pension plans 
without causing the hedge funds to become subject to complex and limiting rules that apply to pension 
plan fiduciaries.
43
  And, although for a number of years there has been significant demand from 
employees for investment advice connected with their DC plans, until 2006 significant hurdles 
discouraged employers and others from directly or indirectly providing advice.
44
  PPA provisions 
addressed those issues by reducing barriers to the provision of information on DC plan investments by 
employers and professional investment advisors.
45
  The PPA provisions had been heavily lobbied for by 
hedge funds and investment advisors who wanted easier access to the business opportunities in 
retirement-specific accounts.  In addition, to signaling the importance of the retirement assets to the 
financial services market, the enactment of those PPA provisions illustrates that as recently as 2006 
legislation effectively reduced the regulatory effect on the relationship between investors in retirement-
specific accounts and the financial services industry 
From the investor-side of the equation, retirement-specific accounts play an important role in 
providing some level of financial security in a system where the governmental Social Security system of 
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retirement benefits is fragile.  More than a third of Americans receive pensions or annuities from 
retirement-specific accounts attributable to employer-sponsored benefit plans.
46
  Those pensions and 
annuities contribute more than 19 percent of the income received by the population age 65 and over.
47
   
In sum, in the current retirement regime, many individuals rely on the capital markets for the 
stability and integrity of their retirement income.  In turn, the capital markets rely on retirement assets as 
both a source of assets to be invested and of fees for the financial services industry.  Regulatory reform 
proposals such as Treasury‟s Blueprint recognize that the framework for regulation of the financial 
markets including futures exchanges, securities offerings, and depository institutions, and futures 
exchanges is now more than 70 years old and increasingly archaic.
48
  The regulatory framework has not 
kept up with evolution of the capital markets, which has developed sophisticated products and faces 
increased competition from foreign capital markets.
49
  What is rarely recognized though is the extent to 
which that framework also has departed from the current paradigm in retirement asset accumulation.  
Given the importance of retirement-specific accounts to the economy, the financial services industry, and 
individuals, regulatory reform will be inadequate unless it addresses the way in which retirement plan 
regulation intertwines with financial services regulation.  
 
B. Regulation of Interactions between Financial Services Firms and Investors  
 
Much of the regulation that is of relevance in reform proposals such as the Blueprint focuses on 
the operation and governance of the capital markets, the relationships between financial services firms, 
and the connections between the government, including government guarantees, and the financial firms.  
Another important set of relationships covered by the reform proposals, however, is the interaction 
between the financial services industry and retail investors.  It is in this latter set of relationships that the 
Blueprint appears to assume, without discussion or a plan for transition, that the new regulatory regime 
will apply to retail investments as undifferentiated amalgamations of assets.  But, that ignores the current 
regulatory approach, which differentiates depending on the type of account in which assets are held. 
Figure 1 shows a simplistic model
50
 of the relationships between the financial services industry 
and retail investors.  Those retail investors all purchase financial products hoping for a positive return on 
their assets.  But, the current regulatory regime splinters authority for regulation of investment-related 
matters among a variety of agencies depending on the type of account that holds the investor‟s assets.  
Without considering all the possible retail investment alternatives, a few examples can make the point.  
Some investors may put after-tax money in retail brokerage accounts and invest in products such as 
mutual funds or securities of individual companies (A$).  Others may decide to hold after-tax money in 
what have historically been viewed as more conservative products such as bank savings accounts, 
certificates of deposits, or US Treasuries (B$).  In either case, this article refers to the investments as 
generalized investment accounts.   
Still other investors save in tax-favored dedicated retirement-specific accounts that generally 
provide an array of investment product choices (R$).  US tax rules provide favorable tax treatment to the 
accumulation of retirement-specific assets so long as the assets are held in a plan or account that meets 
detailed requirements.  Those requirements are intended to achieve specific policy goals such as ensuring 
the fairness of any employer contributions and controlling foregone tax revenue.  It is the accounts or 
plans that meet these requirements that this article refers to as retirement-specific accounts.  Within R$, 
the assets may be held in accounts created through plans sponsored by private-sector employers (referred 
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to here as employer retirement dollars (“ER$”)) or be in accounts established by individuals, not 
employers (individual retirement dollars (“IR$”)).
51
   
Currently federal regulation differentiates R$ not just by establishing minimum tax policy 
requirements for retirement-specific accounts but also by sometimes setting different standards for the 
relationship between the investors of R$ and the financial services industry.  The differentiation is 
observable in both the substantive requirements that govern that relationship and in the regulatory entities 
that develop, administer, and enforce those substantive requirements.  More specifics of the 
differentiation are explored below in Part IV, which also considers the resulting inefficiencies.  First, 
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III.  Paradigm Shifts in Asset Accumulation for Retirement 
The US, UK, and Australia now share an individual savings oriented approach to the 
accumulation of retirement assets.  Over the past thirty years, workers in the US and the UK have taken 
on more individual responsibility in planning for their financial security in retirement.
52
  Australia‟s 
history is a bit different.  Its recent success in generating retirement savings is traceable to 1992 when it 
began requiring employers to contribute to retirement asset accumulation programs.
53
  This Part examines 
those trends and discusses the import for retirement adequacy.     
 
A.  The Transition from Receiving Monthly Checks to Writing Your Own Checks 
For most of the twentieth century one of the many traditions shared by the US and the UK is that 
those employees fortunate enough to have pension plans sponsored by their employers, retired knowing 
that they would receive a monthly check for the rest of their lives.  In benefits terminology, these plans 
are called defined benefit (DB) plans.  All of the plan assets are held in a single retirement-specific 
account and the terms promise a monthly life-time pension check to retirees who meet minimum criteria.  
The amount of the pension promise is based on a formula often related to salary and years of work at the 
employer that established and funded the DB plan.  The employer accepts responsibility to ensure the 
account holds sufficient funds to pay the promised benefits.  The employer, therefore, takes on the 
investment risk of the pension promise.
54
  In the US these types of plans date back to 1875 when the 
American Express Company, then in the railroad business, established a DB plan for its workers.
55
   
In both the US and the UK, DB plans appear to be on their way to becoming historical artifacts.  
Commentators typically point to the unpredictable and significant funding obligations borne by 
employers  and increasing regulatory burdens as primary factors that have caused many employers in the 
US and UK to terminate or freeze their DB obligations and the accounts that hold the assets.
56
  Regardless 
of the impetus, which also may be affected by employee mobility, diminished rates of unionization, and 
the increase in global competition,
57
 the number of US workers who participated in DB accounts fell to 
approximately 18.5 percent of workers in 2003 from 22.9 percent in 1995.  Much of the drop in DB 
coverage occurred earlier in the US than in the UK.  One has to go back to 1980 to find a 35 percent 
coverage rate in the US.
58
  But, although the trend in the UK is more recent, employers there also have 
reduced their use of DB accounts, often by not permitting new employees to earn those benefits.
59
   
The decrease in the numbers and coverage of DB accounts did not spell the end, however, of 
employment-related retirement-specific accounts in either the US or the UK.  Instead, employers shifted 
their focus to accounts that function very much like individual brokerage or savings accounts.  Those are 
known as defined contribution (DC) plans or, in this article‟s terms, DC retirement-specific accounts.  All 
employer-sponsored DC accounts establish an individual investment account for each employee who 
participates in the employer‟s plan.  And, for purposes of this article, I only include accounts governed by 
terms that make the assets held in the account eligible for tax incentives explicitly intended to encourage 
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retirement savings.  Even given the constraints imposed on tax-favored plans, the terms of the DC plan 
that wraps around the assets can vary widely.  A plan may cover one individual or thousands of 
employees.  Those individuals may work for one employer or a variety of employers.  It may be formed 
as a trust or the terms may be set out in a contract.  Contributions to DC retirement-specific accounts may 
come from employers, individuals, or both.  Here, I exclude all programs where benefits are paid by a 
government, such as the US social security program.
60
   
In the US, 401(k) accounts, named after the Internal Revenue Code (Code) section that authorizes 
the accounts, constitute the most frequently held type of employer-sponsored DC retirement-specific 
account.
61
  Sponsorship of accounts that conform with Code section 401(k) has grown from essentially 
zero in 1981
62
 to the point that those plans now have more participants and assets than any other type of 
employer-sponsored DB or DC account.  At year-end 2006, approximately 50 million US workers owned 
401(k) accounts with assets totaling an estimated $2.7 trillion.
63
  
Federal tax law also recognizes a number of types of employer-sponsored DC retirement-specific 
accounts with terms that differ from those of 401(k)s.  Profit sharing plans exist to allow employers to 
contribute a portion of their profits to retirement accounts for their employees.
64
  Regulation provides 
streamlined options for retirement plan sponsorship to small employers such as the Simplified Employee 
Plan (SIMPLE).
65
  All of these accounts hold what is shown in Figure 1 above as ER$. 
In addition, federal tax law permits individuals to open retirement-specific accounts without any 
employer sponsorship or action.  For example, individuals may establish IRAs, which are permitted to 
accept rollovers from employer-sponsored tax-favored plans.
66
  The assets held in these kinds of accounts 
are shown in Figure 1 above as IR$.  The detailed differences certainly matter for tax policy but, 
regardless of those details and the technical plan designations, all of these accounts provide an 
opportunity for the accumulation of retirement wealth in individual accounts.
67
  The non-tax regulatory 
treatment varies significantly between accounts hold ER$ and those holding IR$. 
The UK also has approved a variety of DC retirement-specific accounts in an attempt to 
encourage employees to accumulate assets for retirement.  The first wave of DC accounts in the UK 
consisted of private sector occupational (employer-based) accounts that were established after 1979.  The 
number of those plans has fallen from a peak of 46,730 in 2004 to 33,770 in 2006.  Those accounts were 
established through the use of a trust and membership has remained at about one million.
68
  Beginning in 
1988 the UK provided opportunities for far more people to open a kind of DC account known as a 
personal pension.  Workers were allowed to opt out of a portion of the UK public pension system (the 
portion then known as SERP) and open a personal pension instead.  Alternatively they could opt out of 
their current or former employer-sponsored occupational pension scheme in favor of a personal pension.
69
  
                                                 
60 This definition matches generally to the scope of DC plans covered by ERISA and used by widely-available surveys and 
research.  
61 In addition to work-based DB and DC plans, in the US other formal and informal financial vehicles provide mechanisms for 
the accumulation of retirement wealth.  A full catalog of the many possibilities would require a level of detail not necessary for 
purposes of this Article.    To complicate matters further, these retirement savings vehicles that are based outside the workplace 
may contain assets that originated in work-based plans.  For example, about one-half of the assets held in IRAs originated in 
work-based plans.  Of course, individuals also may save for retirement using methods that are not retirement-specific, whether 
that involves cash stuffed in a mattress or the purchase of an exotic financial instrument.    
62 Muir, supra note 44, at 6. 
63 Sarah Holden, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2006, 13 ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 2 (2007).   
64 Complementary & Private Pensions Throughout the World 2007, Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development 97 
(2008).  
65 Id. 
66 See id. 
67 One type of tax-favored plan that is different is known as an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).  While similar in many 
ways, including individual accounts, longevity risk, and assignment of investment risk, ESOPs must invest primarily in employer 
stock.  Therefore, the choice of investment alternatives issue typically does not occur in ESOPs.    
68 UK ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 8-9, 16. 
69 Elizabeth D. Tedrow, Social Security Privatization in Other Countries – What Lessons Can Be Learned for the United States?, 




The UK next created a new type of retirement-specific account in 2001, which was intended to avoid the 
problems it had encountered with personal pensions.  The goal of those accounts, known as stakeholder 
pensions, was to operate at low cost while meeting a set of minimum requirements intended to protect 
account holders.  The UK requires most employers that do not offer any other type of pension plan 
meeting minimum standards to select a stakeholder scheme and make it available to employees.  There is 
no obligation, though, for either employers or employees to contribute to stakeholder pensions.  For this 
reason, pension participation in the UK remains much lower than in Australia.  As of 2004 only about one 
million individuals had contributed to a stakeholder plan.
70
  Currently the UK has another set of pension 
reforms underway in an effort to increase pension coverage and income.
71
  It plans in 2010 to introduce a 
type of retirement-specific account to be called personal accounts.
72
     
In Australia historic pension coverage for private sector employees has been best explained as 
“haphazard[], covering some occupations and not others and providing markedly variable conditions and 
benefits.”
73
  There was, and continues to be, some use of DB pensions.
74
  In the mid-1980s DC pensions, 
called accumulation pensions in Australia,
75
 became widespread through union agreements, with coverage 
reaching 79 percent in the early 1990s.
76
   
Against that backdrop, Australia made a bold move in 1992 by adopting a mandatory private 
pension scheme known as its Superannuation Guarantee.
77
  The Guarantee began as a requirement that 
employers contribute three or four percent of earnings for almost all employees to individualized 
accounts.  The accounts are held by and invested in superannuation funds, which vary widely in factors 
such as numbers of members, investment strategy, whether they are open to the public or restricted in 
some way such as to a particular industry.
78
  The amount of the mandatory contribution made by 
employers has increased over time and currently is nine percent of earnings.
79
 The mandatory, 
employment-based nature of the Australian system has resulted in a participation rate above 90 percent. 
80
 
Superannuation Guarantee accounts operate as DC accounts, which are invested and administered 
by not-for-profit funds or by for profit commercial enterprises.
81
  Those entities create account products 
that meet the required regulatory terms.  Employers designate one or more entities to accept the 
employer‟s contributions.  In 1996 the Australian government adopted a policy to encourage competition 
among the funds that could receive superannuation contributions by permitting individuals to have some 
choice among funds.
82
  The policy of choice was so controversial that legislation to permit choice was not 
enacted until 2004 and implementation of choice began in mid-2005.
83
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Whether one looks at the UK, Australia, or the US, the new standard in work-related retirement 
plans is increasingly becoming similar to the equivalent of an individual investment or savings account.  
Figure 2 summarizes pension-related savings vehicles with individual accounts in the US, UK, and 
Australia.  Employers may, or in the US and the UK may not, contribute to the accounts.  The details of 
the accounts vary widely in many details, including whether assets are held in a trust or governed by 
contract, the minimum and maximum annual contributions, and regulation of the distribution of account 
assets before and after retirement.  All of those details are important from the perspective of tax policy, 
the rights of account holders, and obligations of employers.  However, for purposes of considering the 
ways in which the regulation of DC retirement-specific accounts intersects with the regulation of the 
financial services industry, it is the individualized nature of the accounts and the relationship between the 
account holders and those, including employers and financial services firms, who sit on the other side of 
the equation that is relevant. And, while it is possible that the US paradigm could shift once again to DB 




B. Risks in a DC World for the Accumulation of Retirement Assets 
 
The paradigm shift from DB plans to DC retirement-specific assets has rendered current 
regulation an outdated solution to a very different set of risks than existed in the 1970s when the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
85
 the primary federal statute regulating 
employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts, was enacted.  Commentators have written extensively 
on the implications the convergence of work-related retirement plans on a DC model have for the 
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Figure 2.  Retirement-Specific Accounts with Individual Accounts 
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adequacy of retirement income.
86
  This section focuses on a different question -- the changes in the risk 
profile of asset accumulation that have resulted from the movement to a DC model.  Unlike in DB plans, 
individuals, not employers, may choose whether they will participate in a work-related retirement plan.  
Individuals, not employers, typically choose how to invest the assets.  Individuals, not employers, bear 
the investment risk on the accounts.  And, individuals, not employers, decide how the accumulated assets 
will be distributed in retirement.  As recognized by other commentators, the effect of these changes on 
risk can be categorized as participation risk, investment risk, and longevity risk.
87
  The regulatory 
challenges created by these risks differ significantly in a DC model from those that existed under the DB 
plan model in place when Congress enacted ERISA in 1974.  
Consider participation risk first.  Both the percentage of employees in the US covered by and the 
number of employees who participated in either a DB or a DC style work-related retirement-specific 
account dropped between 1999 and 2003.  Coverage rates decreased to 46.7 percent in 2003 from 50 
percent in 1999.
88
  This decrease is more problematic than is first apparent.  Evidence shows that 
significant numbers of employees covered by (eligible to participate in) DC plans do not choose to 
contribute and that lower-paid workers are less likely to contribute (participate) as compared to more 
highly paid workers.
89
  Thus, the shift to DC retirement-specific accounts increases the participation risk 
for employees because participation depends not only on whether the employer offers a plan but also 
whether employees choose to contribute. 
The shift to DC retirement-specific accounts has also increased the investment risk for 
employees.  Most DC accounts delegate investment choice to employees.  Since the benefit an employee 
receives from such a plan is whatever amount is in that employee‟s account at retirement or distribution 
of the assets, the employee bears the investment risk.  The result is to shift to employees not just the risk 
that a particular asset might perform poorly but also the risk that the appropriate holding period for some 
investments in a diversified portfolio may be longer than an individual employee can tolerate and the 
capital markets may be weak at the time that an individual employee retires or draws down assets.
90
  DB 
plans, which typically were adopted with the intent that they would be in place for many years, could at 
least theoretically spread the risk of a down period in the markets or the risk of assets with long holding 
periods over the life of the DB plan.
91
 
Finally, in a DB plan the requirement that the employer fund the plan sufficiently to pay promised 
benefits combined with the fact that benefits are paid for a retiree‟s lifetime means that employers bore 
the longevity risks in those plans.  Most DC plans provide that assets will be distributed in a lump sum.  
Tax regulation requires that minimum distributions occur after a set age.  Although nothing prevents the 
owner of assets held in a DC account to use those assets, either before or after distribution, to purchase an 
annuity, most retirees choose not to do so.  As a result, retirees with DC retirement-specific accounts risk 
the possibility of outliving their accumulated assets.
 92
   This risk is higher for women who statistically 
have longer life spans than men and tend to accumulate lower levels of assets for retirement.
93
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The UK has experienced a similar shift in risk as the US.   As in the US, the UK has seen a shift 
from DB to DC retirement-specific accounts.
94
  The current voluntary system means UK pension savers 
face participation risk, as illustrated by the low number of individuals who contribute to stakeholder 
plans.  Individuals in the UK typically have fewer investment choices and usually the account provides 
for a default investment so the risk in choosing the wrong investment is lower.  However, individual 
account holders still bear the investment risk in the sense that their entitlement is equivalent to the amount 
accumulated in their retirement-specific account.  And, the defined contribution nature of accounts 
combined with a lack of annuity distributions means that individuals also bear longevity risk.  Australia 
avoids the first of these risks – that of participation – by mandating employer contributions to 
Superannuation Guarantee accounts. However, even in Australia, individual DC account holders bear 
both investment and longevity risk. 
 
IV. Risk, Regulation and the Division of Regulatory Authority  
 
This Part considers how current regulation addresses the risks inherent in DC retirement-specific 
accounts and the problems that result.  It begins by examining the allocation of regulatory authority vis-à-
vis employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts and shows that the allocation is a historical artifact 
attributable to the DB pensions that were the standard at the time of ERISA‟s enactment.  That approach 
is contrasted to the regulatory oversight of retirement-specific accounts that are not employer sponsored 
and of generalized investment accounts.  For perspective and alternative approaches, the Part compares 
the regulatory challenges and the distribution of authority in the US to the approaches used in the UK and 
Australia.  
 
A. Current Allocation of Regulatory Authority 
 
The current US regulatory regime, which applies to all employee benefit plans sponsored by 
private-sector employers, is found in ERISA.  Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 after ten years of 
debate.
95
  A defining event for pension regulation was Studebaker‟s closing of its automobile assembly 
plant in South Bend, Indiana in 1963.  Studebaker had sponsored a DB pension plan for its employees but 
that plan was drastically underfunded when Studebaker failed.
 96
  As a result, most employees and retirees 
received only a small portion of the pensions they expected or nothing at all. The severe economic impact 
on retirees and workers attracted the attention of law makers.
97
  Eventually, the Senate held subcommittee 
hearings featuring testimony by workers from a number of companies who did not receive the pensions 
their employers had promised.
98
   
As a result of these unmet worker expectations, much of the congressional focus when enacting 
ERISA was on ensuring that employers kept the benefit promises they made to their employees.
99
  The 
statutory mechanisms used to achieve security of DB pension promises included enhanced disclosure 
requirements, imposition of fiduciary standards, vesting and funding provisions, and private rights of 
enforcement.
100
   Congress was also concerned with the amount and proper use of the tax expenditure for 
pension plans.  Thus, ERISA limits both benefits from and contributions to retirement plans.
101
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Throughout the wrangling over benefits legislation, the DOL and IRS competed to receive 
regulatory authority over the benefits field.
102
  The fight extended to arguments over which 
subcommittees in the House and Senate had jurisdiction over the proposed legislation.
103
  Congress 
ultimately resolved the turf battles by, as Rep. John Erlenborn put it, “cut[ting] the baby in half… [and 
leaving each committee and agency with] half this dead child.”
104
  
There was little pretense that the division of authority was other than a politically expedient 
solution.  Even at the time, some legislators anticipated the inefficiencies that would result from 
overlapping jurisdiction.
105
  Because Congress‟s technical solution was to write many of the statutory 
provisions into both the labor and the tax sections of the US Code,
106
  the IRS and DOL eventually agreed 
to cede each other authority over specific types of regulation.  Under the agreement, the IRS received 
responsibility for funding, eligibility to participate in plans, and ensuring entitlement to plan funds.  The 
DOL received authority over fiduciary issues, proper disclosure, and claims procedures.  Currently the 
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), an agency within the DOL, exercises most of the 
DOL‟s responsibilities for oversight of benefit-related issues.
107
  The anomalous approach to duplicative 




Those interested in the reform of financial services oversight will immediately notice that there is 
no obvious role for the SEC
109
 in the regulation of employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts. 
Although the SEC is responsible for regulatory implementation of disclosure requirements that govern the 
release of information by public companies and mutual funds to investors,
110
 EBSA has authority over the 
disclosure requirements imposed on employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts, including on 
certain of the investments in those accounts.
111
  While the SEC works with self-regulatory organizations 
such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) to set standards for the conduct of broker-
dealers and other industry participants who deal directly with investors,
112
 it is EBSA that oversees the 
fiduciary obligations of those individuals and entities who interact with employees who invest through 
employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts.
113
  The scope of the securities fraud provision overseen 
by the SEC is widely recognized for its breadth in reaching material misrepresentations or omissions 
connected with the purchase and sale of any security as defined by the federal securities laws.
114
  In 
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comparison, for employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts, claims of misrepresentations or 
omissions fall within ERISA‟s fiduciary regime and are subject to ERISA‟s limitations on remedies.
115
  
Another dimension of complexity is added by those accounts, such as IRAs that are retirement-specific 
accounts but are not employer-sponsored.  EBSA has little to no regulatory authority over those accounts.  
Even though they have much the same tax treatment and share many other characteristics with employer-
sponsored retirement-specific accounts, federal regulation treats the non-employer sponsored accounts 
differently from retirement-specific accounts in plans sponsored by employers. 
Concentration of oversight responsibilities at DOL and IRS for employer-sponsored benefit plans 
was a rational approach when the primary risks to employees were, as was true in DB pension plans, that 
employers would not keep the promises that they were making of lifetime pension payments.  The 
relationship risks were that an employer would not properly fund a plan, would commit malfeasance with 
respect to plan assets, or would be dishonest in explaining pension entitlement to employees.  The 
employer‟s role and actions were the main determinant of whether an employee would receive the 
pension promised by the employer.  As explained above, however, the DB plan is no longer the 
paradigmatic pension plan and the primary risk faced by employees is no longer that employers will not 
keep promises of life time pension payments.  The methods used to accumulate wealth for retirement 
have changed but the regulation and division of regulatory responsibility has not.  
The UK and Australia have taken quite different fundamental approaches to the regulation of 
retirement-specific accounts and to the integration of that regulation with oversight of other types of 
investment activities.  Australia, where the employment-related pension system, the Superannuation 
Guarantee, is relatively new, does not have a workplace regulator as one of its key regulators for the 
Guarantee.  Instead, it divides authority among the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO).
116
  ASIC‟s primary function is to regulate the business activities of all corporate entities in 
Australia.  Included among those corporate entities are the financial entities that are active in providing 
the investment funds in which superannuation contributions are held and invested.
117
  In 1998, ASIC 
assumed responsibility for consumer protection vis-à-vis pension accounts and investments.
118
  This 
includes responsibility for disclosure requirements that are intended to provide investors with information 
necessary to make informed investment choices.
119
  APRA regulates the financial services sector from a 
prudential standpoint.  As such, it is responsible to ensure prudent management so that the entities 
offering funds as investment vehicles for superannuation maintain the financial resources to meet their 
obligations.
120
   
Thus, retirement-specific accounts are included in the regulatory authority of ASIC and APRA in 
a way that does not generally differentiate between those accounts and other, non-retirement specific 
investment activities.  Furthermore, Australia‟s regulation of superannuation follows the objectives-based 
approach that Australia applies more generally to financial services regulation.
121
 For example, one 
objective is to ensure that funds maintain sufficient assets to meet their obligations.  Supervision of that 
objective is the task of APRA regardless of whether the financial services entity is holding assets that in 
the US would constitute A$, B$ or R$. 
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Compare the approach of the UK where the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and The Pensions 
Regulator (TPR) divide primary regulatory responsibility for pension plan oversight.
122
  The FSA and 
TPR have entered into a detailed memorandum of understanding that allocates authority between the two 
entities.  At the conceptual level, the memorandum divides authority on the basis of the entities subject to 
oversight.  The FSA, as an integrated part of its mission to “regulate[] the financial services industry in 
the UK,”
123
 regulates the financial and insurance firms that advise on the marketing, sale, and provision of 
personal pensions and annuities.  The FSA also has responsibility for improving investor knowledge and 
understanding of financial products and markets.
124
  This includes the responsibility to improve 
employees‟ understanding of the purchase of pension products through education and disclosure. The 





 on its own website.
127
  The TPR‟s role is to oversee and provide advice to employers 
and to trustees of work-based pension plans.  In general TPR has responsibility for oversight of and 
providing advice to employers and to trustees of work-based pension plans.  TPR is a public body 
accountable to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
128
   
The specific differences in the way the US, UK, and Australia have assigned regulatory authority 
for work related pension savings are traceable to differing philosophies on division of that authority.  
Looking at the division between the IRS and EBSA, the US divides authority according to the types of 
legal issues that arise in the accounts – what I will call an issue oriented approach.   If it is a fiduciary or 
disclosure issue, it belongs to the EBSA.  If it is an issue of plan funding, it belongs to the IRS.  The SEC 
and other financial services regulators are not part of that mix.    
 At the conceptual level, in the UK the FSA and TPR divide authority on the basis of the entities 
subject to oversight.
129
  The FSA oversees the relationship between the individual employees who have 
pension accounts and the financial services firms that administer those accounts and provide the 
underlying investment products. Australia departs even further from the workplace model of regulation by 
dividing authority among ASIC, APRA, and ATO, with APRA playing the key role in consumer 
protection for other than prudential matters.  In contrast, the US assigns to EBSA significant regulatory 
authority over the relationship between the individual employees who have pension accounts and the 
entities that administer the accounts.  For example, disputes over mishandled investment directions are 
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governed by ERISA as fiduciary disputes, and thus are the territory of EBSA.
130
   Similarly, EBSA has 
responsibility for disclosure requirements regarding benefits statements and such investment-related 
material as account fees.
131
   
 
B. An Operational Analysis of Risk 
 
As DC retirement-specific accounts have become more prevalent,
132
 the risks to employees in 
their accumulation of retirement wealth have changed.  The risks of participation, investment return, and 
longevity all pose challenges to the ability of individuals to save enough to support themselves in 
retirement. This subpart analyzes specific examples of ways these risks have affected retirement savings, 
thereby highlighting the problems posed for substantive regulation and the division of regulatory 
authority. 
  
1. Choice of Investments 
 
One of the risks associated with DC accounts is investment risk.  In DB plans, employers that 
sponsored the plans typically determined, directly or indirectly, the investment allocation of plan assets.  
That made sense in a style of plan where the employer also bore the investment risk.  In DC plans, 
however, individuals typically must make their own investment allocation decisions and bear the resulting 
risk.
133
  This assumption of risk becomes particularly perilous when individuals make undiversified bets 
in their account investments, choose the wrong type of retirement-specific account, or need retirement 
income during a down period in the markets.  If employees are given a choice of investments or accounts, 
the regulatory system must anticipate that not all employees will make efficient choices.  The alternative, 
of course, is a paternalistic system that constrains employees‟ ability to make investment choices.     
 
a. US - Employer Stock  
  
In the US, legal issues relating to the investment of pension assets in the stock of the plan‟s 
sponsoring employer were largely dormant, other than in the context of potential corporate takeovers
134
 
and Employee Stock Ownership Plans,
135
 until two events occurred in rapid succession.  Those events 
resulted in large losses in investments held in employer stock in retirement-specific accounts by 
employees of a variety of companies.  The first event was the dramatic drop in the US stock markets after 
the bursting of the tech bubble in early 2000.  The second event was the collapse of Enron Corporation in 
2001, which was followed by a surge in governance and accounting scandals at other US companies.   
   In the employer stock cases, employees alleged wrongdoing against an array of individuals and 
institutions including the companies sponsoring the plans, individual plan fiduciaries, company directors, 
and directed trustees.  The legal claims brought under ERISA can generally be divided into three 
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regulatory standards are met.  For a discussion of the standards and other issues with delegation of investment choice, see Muir, 
supra note 44, at 8-10. 
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hostile corporate takeover situations). 
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categories, all based in fiduciary obligation.  As such, EBSA was the agency responsible for providing 
regulatory oversight and interpretation and it took an active role in some of the litigation.
136
  
 The employer stock cases serve to illustrate the distinctions drawn in the regulation of employer-
sponsored retirement-specific accounts (accounts holding ER$) compared to generalized investment 
accounts (accounts holding A$) and retirement-specific accounts not sponsored by employers (accounts 
holding IR$).  Assume an employee, Saver, invests $100 in the stock of Saver‟s employer, Employer, 
through Employer‟s 401(k) (a retirement-specific account holding ER$)
137
 and another $100 in the same 
stock through a brokerage account (a generalized investment account holding A$).  Saver loses most of 
the investment when the stock‟s value drops.  If Saver then alleges that Employer intentionally 
misrepresented its business prospects, Saver might bring a lawsuit for fiduciary violation under ERISA 
for losses in the retirement-specific account but would claim securities fraud under section 10b of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
138
 for losses in the generalized investment account.  The agency 
responsible for regulatory oversight of the ERISA claim would be EBSA but the SEC would be 
responsible for oversight of regulation regarding securities fraud.  Similarly, if an investor alleges fraud in 
a retirement-specific account not sponsored by an employer, EBSA would have no responsibility for 
oversight.  Burdens of proof, the right to sue, and other litigation-related matters can be quite different 
between ERISA and securities law claims.
139
  Yet, Saver‟s basic claim is the same in each instance – 
Employer intentionally misrepresented its business prospects.  Perhaps this approach is optimal but the 
question fragmentation of law and oversight deserves a careful review as part of the reform of financial 
services regulation. 
Another complication arises because of the different approach to regulation in the different types 
of investment accounts.  Saver might claim that Employer‟s misrepresentation was one of omission.  
Saver‟s legal theory might be that the information Employer conveyed was misleading because it left out 
significant facts and thus what was communicated was misleading.  Or, Saver might allege that Employer 
had information that Employer did not communicate to Saver but, if Saver would have known the 
information, Saver would not have purchased additional Employer stock or may have sold Employer 
stock.  This scenario raises the question of whether ERISA‟s general fiduciary provisions require more 
frequent or more extensive disclosure to employees holding stock in retirement-specific accounts than the 
securities laws require public companies to make to their shareholders.
140
  This question creates another 
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layer of difficulty.  If employees who hold stock in employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts are 
entitled to superior disclosure as compared to general public shareholders then compliance with the 
disclosure requirements to the employees would violate the federal securities law prohibition on tipping 
and insider trading.  Similarly, the employees‟ resulting trades would violate the insider trading rules. 
EBSA‟s position on the insider trading issues has been that the ERISA and federal securities law 
obligations can be rationalized.
141
  According to EBSA‟s view, which has been accepted by a majority of 
courts,
142
 companies must make public disclosures at the earliest time and to the highest standard of 
disclosure required by either ERISA or the securities laws.
143
   
Most of the reporting requirements under the federal securities laws impose quarterly and annual 
disclosure obligations.  Even then, companies have wide latitude in not reporting material facts so long as 
the omissions do not cause the disclosures that are made to be misleading.  So, for example, the securities 
laws typically would not require a company to report, mid-quarter, a significant decrease in sales or 
increase in costs.  If, however, ERISA imposes an affirmative obligation on fiduciaries to report material 
information that investors in retirement-specific accounts would find important in making investment 
decisions, the fiduciaries would have to report the sales or costs information to the employee investors.  
Then the securities laws would require simultaneous reporting of the information to the public 
shareholders in order to avoid repercussions for the company and the employee investors under insider 
trading theories.   The result is that implied reporting requirements under a pension law, which is 
interpreted by EBSA, would effectively require reporting of information by a company to all of its 
shareholders in numerous situations where the federal securities laws, as interpreted by the SEC, would 
not otherwise require reporting.  EBSA is correct that the two legal requirements can co-exist,  but this is 
an odd way to set public disclosure requirements.
144
 
The risks of choosing an investment strategy obviously derive from more than disclosure.  As 
noted above, basic finance theory provides that employees who hold stock of their employer concentrate 
their risk by investing their human capital and financial capital in the same company.  Empirical studies 
suggest that investing in company stock exposes employees to greater risks without commensurately 
compensating them for that risk.
145
  Nor do employees as a general matter seem to benefit from any 
increased access to information about their company.  Research indicates that no correlation exists 
between employees‟ elections to invest in company stock in their retirement-specific accounts and later 
performance of that stock.
146
  Wider access to investment advice on such basic investing concepts might 
help retail investors increase diversification and lower their risks.   
Regulation affects the availability of investment advice across the full range of an investor‟s 
accounts.  In the US, investment advisors are subject to EBSA regulation for advice given regarding 
assets held in employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts (ER$) and to regulation by the SEC for 
advice provided regarding assets held in other retirement-specific and generalized investment accounts 
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(A$, B$, and IR$).  In some respects, the ERISA standards, being fiduciary-based, are the harsher of the 
two standards.  As a result, it is a frequent practice for investment advisors to provide advice across the 
entire spectrum of an individual‟s financial planning needs with the sole exclusion of employer-sponsored 
retirement-specific investment accounts.
147
  The outcome of the omission of retirement-specific assets is 
likely to be a lack of an integrated investment strategy. 
The problem in the US remains, though perhaps to a lesser extent, even after statutory changes in 
2006, which were intended to expand 401(k) participants‟ access to investment advice.
148
  Rather than 
eliminate differences in the standards governing advice or allocate authority to a single regulator, the 
legislative changes authorized advice to 401(k) plan account holders if the advisors meet specific 
standards.  Of particular importance under the legislation is the structure of advisory fees and disclosure 
of conflicts of interest.
149
  The legislation improved access to investment advice but failed to address the 
underlying structural issue of regulatory fragmentation. 
 




 the UK experimented as early as 1988 with giving individuals the right to 
opt out of certain government or employer-based retirement-specific accounts and instead to establish 
personal pensions.  In some senses the choice of personal pensions gave individuals power over 
investments because they were able to choose any authorized financial services vendor to provide the 
personal pensions.   The choice, also, though was one of participation.  Individuals could choose what 
type of account, the government-sponsored scheme, the employer-sponsored scheme, or the personal 
pension, they preferred. 
From the standpoint of demand, personal pensions were an immediate success.  Financial services 
firms established commissioned sales programs and aggressively advertised their products.  The 
marketing worked and individuals opened personal pensions at rates that far exceeded projections.
151
   
When analyzed from the perspective of asset accumulation for retirement, however, an entirely 
different story on personal pensions emerges.  Reports began to surface that sales of personal pensions 
were not complying with the relevant regulatory standards.  In 1992 the Securities and Investments Board 
(SIB) reviewed a sample of the records associated with personal pension sales and found that only nine 
per cent substantially complied with regulatory rules.
152
  As a result of its concern, the SIB commissioned 
a study of industry practices.   That study found “‟widespread regulatory compliance failure‟” 
153
 
Ultimately regulators required financial services firms that had sold personal pensions and 
independent financial advisors who provided advice to purchasers to undertake a two-part review process 
intended to identify misselling that occurred between April 1988 and June 1994.  The priority phase 
covered older purchasers who were at or near retirement.  Phase two extended to younger purchasers, who 
typically were younger than 50.  As of June 2002, FSA estimated that the pensions industry would pay 
out £11.8 billion (approximately $20.1 billion at the current exchange ratio) after reviewing the records of 
1.7 million customers.
154
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Professors Black and Nobles chastise the regulators for failing, until the 1992 SIB audit, to focus 
their regulatory efforts on personal pensions as a product line.  The regulators allegedly suffered from a 
lack of expertise with personal pensions, which constituted a new line of products.  Instead of watching 
for patterns of problematic activity in personal pensions, the regulators established review processes that 
tended to focus on the behavior of particular financial services firms.  According to Professors Black and 
Nobles, the regulators emphasized reviews of the activities of internal firm controls.  As a result, the 
regulators missed the problems that existed across the financial services industry in the marketing and 
sale of personal pension accounts.  Both the government inquiry and Nobles and Black concluded that the 
incentives for aggressive sales created by the commission salary structures for salespeople were at the 
heart of the industry-wide misselling.
155
  During the misselling period, responsibility was divided among 
three regulators.  The UK later transitioned to a single regulatory financial system with the FSA as 
regulator.
156
   
   
 
c. Australia – A “Bad” Investment 
 
Australians received the right in 2005 to direct the investment of assets in their retirement-
specific accounts.
157
  To date, individual investment directions have not generated a great deal of reported 
controversy.  One recent case, however, illustrates how the Australian system addresses an investor‟s 
claim that his money was improperly invested.  In the case, the investor, Mr. Wallace, alleged that the 
trustee of his account did not follow his verbal direction to convert the investments in his account from 
“high risk, high tech” shares to a more “secure portfolio.”
158
  Between the time that the trustee allegedly 
should have implemented the direction in March 2000 and February 2001 Mr. Wallace‟s account lost its 
entire value of over Australian $380,000.
159
 
The claim was initially heard by the Australian Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (Tribunal), a 
specialized tribunal authorized to hear benefits-related disputes. In a decision later reversed on other 
grounds,
160
 the Tribunal found in favor of Mr. Wallace.  Its decision, though, was not based on the 
trustee‟s failure to follow Mr. Wallace‟s purported investment direction.  Instead, the Tribunal considered 
whether the trustee breached its legal duty in adopting the initial investment strategy, which permitted a 
pensioner aged 70 to invest nearly his entire retirement-specific account in highly speculative stock.  The 
Tribunal found that trustees have an obligation to ensure that the investment strategy is correctly 
formulated for the individual circumstances of the investor.
161
  In Mr. Wallace‟s circumstances the 
original aggressive investment strategy was considered too aggressive.  Although Australian case law is 
limited, the Wallace case indicates that Australia takes a significantly more paternalistic approach to the 
selection of investments for retirement-specific accounts than does the US.   
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2. Account Fees 
 
Along with the rates of contributions and return on investment, account and investment fees 
fundamentally impact the accumulation of assets in all types of investment accounts.  In the world of 
traditional economic theory and perfect markets, one would expect rational investors and fiduciaries to 
consider fees as a factor in the selection of investment products and account services.
162
  Behavioral 
economics, however, has offered a number of possible explanations for how and why traditional 




The UK anticipated the problem of inefficiently high account fees when it established stakeholder 
pensions.  At the time they were first made available for investment in 2001 the UK capped stakeholder 
scheme charges at 1.0 per cent per year.  Effective in 2005 the UK increased the cap to 1.5 per cent a year 
for the first 10 years of a customer account.  Thereafter the account fee cap drops back to 1.0 per cent.
164
   
In the UK a recent study of fees charged by stakeholder plan default funds implies that the 
regulatory caps have had a significant impact on account fees.  Expectations based on general fee data 
would lead to the expectation that the approximately fifty per cent of default funds which utilize a passive 
investment style would have lower fees than the default funds that consist of actively managed funds.  
The actual modal investment fee however is 1.0 per cent across both active and passive default funds.  It 
appears from this data that, in practice, the fee cap has been established as a floor for stakeholder scheme 
fees.  The mean charge of passive default funds is 20 basis points lower than the mean for active default 
funds, which is somewhat more in accordance with expectations. And a number of other factors may 
impact the fees charged, including the level of services provided by the scheme and the size of the 
employee population at a particular workplace.
165
  But, the point remains that available data indicate that 
regulation has had an impact on account fees. 
Fees also have been of great interest in Australia.  In 2002, Professor Ian Ramsay prepared a 
report for ASIC evaluating fee reporting in the product disclosure statements provided to individuals to 
make investment decisions and in periodic reporting of account returns to investors.
166
  Professor Ramsay 
recommended increasing the standardization of fee discussions and definitions, including specific 
recommendations for various types of fees.
167
  Subsequently, ASIC published model fee disclosures for 
product disclosure statements, regulatory changes required increased and standardized fee reporting,
168
 
and ASIC‟s website now hosts a tool that enables investors to compare fees and other factors about 
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  Research indicates that the changes have increased the transparency 
of fee reporting.
170
  The increased requirements, however, have been criticized on the basis that they are 
too detailed and technical for typical investors,
171
 and the sheer number of funds in the Australian market 
arguably contributes to the difficulties of market participants in monitoring fees.
172
 
To date the US has failed to adopt legislation directly addressing 401(k) account fees.  This 
author was a member of the 2004 EBSA Advisory Council working group that studied the disclosure of 
account fees in 401(k) accounts.  The working group published a report, which included both factual 
findings regarding failings in current fee disclosures and recommendations intended to enhance fee 
disclosure.  The issue was widely recognized as a concern.  After evaluating a variety of problems with 
current methods of disclosing, or failing to disclose, fees in 401(k) plans, one commentator observed that 
“[t]he disclosure of fees paid by 401(k) participants currently is closer to what behavioral economics 
would prescribe for hiding information than it is to clear, informative disclosure.”
173
  A separate reporting 




In 2006 plan sponsors were forced to pay attention to the fees question after a number of lawsuits 
were filed alleging that 401(k) plan fee structures violate ERISA‟s general fiduciary requirements.   Some 
of the suits claim that plan fiduciaries violated their ERISA obligations by failing to understand or capture 
for the plan fees paid by one plan service provider (such as a mutual fund) to another service provider 
(such as a record keeper).
175
  Suits also have presented claims that plan fiduciaries failed to appropriately 






3.   Default Investments 
 
 There are a variety of routes through which individuals with employer-sponsored retirement-
specific accounts may have their account assets allocated to a default investment.  Default investments 
raise both of the issues just analyzed – selection of the investment vehicle and the amount of plan fees.  If 
an employee‟s assets are invested into a default investment vehicle, someone had to choose what that 
vehicle would be.  And the fees associated with that vehicle will affect the employee‟s investment returns. 
In the US, the terms of a 401(k) plan may include automatic enrollment.  If an employer adopts 
automatic enrollment, new employees are enrolled automatically in the 401(k) plan unless they 
affirmatively opt out of the plan.  Research and experience indicates that such automatic enrollment 
features help overcome employee inertia and thereby increase the take-up rate for 401(k) plans.
177
  Plans 
with automatic enrollment, though, need to determine a default investment for the contributions of those 
employees who are enrolled under the automatic feature.  Similarly where an employee enrolls in a 
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401(k) plan or transfers funds from another plan but does not select among available investment options, 
the plan must default contributions to an investment vehicle.     
 Although issues associated with default investments had been observable in 401(k) plans since 
those plans became popular, EBSA did not issue guidance on default fund selection until October 2007.  
Prior to that guidance, survey data showed that forty-five per cent of US 401(k) plans provided for a 
stable-value fund or money-market fund as the default.
178
  The goal of selecting stable-value or money-
market funds as default funds tends to be the preservation of capital as opposed to investment growth.  
Prior to the 2008 market downturn, such conservative default investments were heavily criticized 
particularly for younger investors.
179
  The 2007 guidance, in the form of regulations issued by EBSA, 
established a safe harbor protecting an employer from liability if the employer selects a default fund that 
possesses the characteristics of what EBSA terms a Qualified Default Investment Alternative (QDIA).  
An employer may, however, at its own risk designate a fund that is not a QDIA as a default fund.  With 
the exception of investments that pre-date the regulation and investments during the first 120 days of an 
employee‟s participation in a 401(k) plan, a QDIA must consist of a mix of investments that take into 
account either the characteristics of the individual account holder or of a group of employees. 
An example of the use of default investments in the UK occurs in employer-selected stakeholder 
schemes.  In order to meet the minimum requirements of a stakeholder scheme, the employer must 
designate a default investment vehicle.
180
  In the UK, a recent study of the stakeholder pension plan 
schemes registered as of December 2006 found that the default funds offered in those schemes are less 
uniform than one might expect.  The study reviewed default funds selected by financial services firms that 
developed stakeholder pension products.  When an employer chooses a particular stakeholder scheme, 
that employer has the option of designating a default fund that is different from the default fund selected 
by the financial services firm.  The data indicate, however, that most employers accept the default option 
suggested by the financial firm that packaged the stakeholder pension product.
181
 
 Among the registered stakeholder pension products, the default funds were almost evenly split 
between actively and passively managed funds.  A few default funds were styled as UK equity funds but 
the majority were evenly divided between global equity funds and balanced funds.  It is difficult to 
rationalize these significant differences in the types of funds chosen by financial services firms as default 
funds.  A firm that markets a given stakeholder scheme typically markets that scheme to a wide variety of 
employers with various employee demographics.  Perhaps the financial services firms do not agree on the 
appropriate type of default fund for the average individual who opens a stakeholder pension account.  Or 
the firms may not be in agreement over the typical earnings, other investment holdings, risk tolerances 
and other characteristics of the average individual account holder.
182
  In the absence of specific rationales 
for the difference in the types of default funds chosen, however, some of those selections must be less 
than optimal. 
 In addition to its requirement that stakeholder schemes establish a default fund, in 2005 the UK 
began to require that every stakeholder default fund utilize a life-cycle profile.  By ensuring that years 
remaining to retirement age is a consideration in the structure of a default portfolio, the requirement 
addresses some of the concern over the variance in default funds.  Implementation of the life-cycle 
requirement is not totally uniform across stakeholder schemes but the vast majority of the schemes begin 




 In recent years, Australia has increasingly increased choice in superannuation accounts including 
choice of fund and choice of investments within a particular fund.
184
  Research indicates though that most 
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Australians leave their superannuation assets in the default fund.
185
 Another study indicates that 
Australian‟s loss aversion with respect to their superannuation accounts is likely to discourage investors 





V.  Regulatory Reform – Strategies for Addressing Risk in Retirement-Specific Accounts 
 
The Blueprint approach to reform of the regulation that governs the US financial services sector 
concentrates on reorganizing responsibilities among existing and newly created federal agencies.
187
  Much 
of the focus, as it should be, is on the operation of the financial markets.
188
  Other ideas, at least in the 
Blueprint, are to decrease the jurisdiction of the SEC and create a new regulator of business conduct.  
Similarly, the Blueprint calls for creation of a prudential regulator and for federalization of some 
insurance regulation that is now the province of state regulators.
189
  In assigning responsibilities and in 
eventually developing the substantive regulation to be overseen by the SEC, the new business conduct 
regulator, and new prudential financial regulator, policymakers must determine the role these regulators 
will have with respect to retirement-specific accounts, particularly those accounts that are part of 
employer-sponsored plans.  Effective regulation also will need to recognize the risks associated with 
retirement-specific accounts and the relationship of those risks with generalized investment accounts. 
The Blueprint identifies regulation of the relationship between financial institutions and financial 
services customers as the province of the new business conduct regulator.  That regulation would have 
two functions in governing the relationship between institutions and customers.  Its first role would be to 
regulate disclosure practices.  Second, it would regulate the institutions‟ conduct of business practices.
190
   
In thinking about why – or if -- financial products and the entities that develop, market, sell, and 
trade those products should be regulated at all, some economists have suggested two roles for regulation.  
One role is to circumscribe the conduct of business to ensure fairness and appropriate disclosure.
191
  The 
second role is to ensure the financial system and the financial actors are fiscally sound.
192
  Professor 
Hazel Bateman takes a slightly different perspective in explaining the need for regulation in the area of 
financial services.  She focuses on three causes of market failures in the financial services area, all of 
which apply in the context of retirement-specific accounts.  Those causes are information asymmetry, 
externalities, and market power.  In the Australian context, the mandatory nature of participation in the 
superannuation accounts comprises another factor supporting the need for regulation.
193
  This Part 
considers the issues associated with disclosure and business practices before discussing two competing 




Whether assets are held in retirement-specific accounts or in generalized investment accounts, 
disclosure occurs at two levels.  Both levels can be seen as addressing information asymmetries, which 
                                                 
185 See id. at 5. 
186
See Tim Frey et. al., Will Investors Change Their Superannuation Fund Given the Choice?, 47 ACCTG. & FIN. 267 
(2007).  
187BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 137-38. 
188 Id. at 137. 
189 BLUEPRINT, supra note 5, at 4. 
190 Id. at 170.  The business conduct regulator would have a third function as well, chartering and licensing providers of financial 
products and services.  Id. 
191 Jim Stewart, Financial Regulation in Ireland:  Should the Regulator be the Central Bank?, 9 J. FIN. REG. & COMPL. 42, 44-45 
(2001).  But see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:  A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
(1998) (suggesting that securities issues be allowed to choose their regulatory regime, including the level of required disclosure). 
192 Stewart, supra note 191, at 44-45. 
193




are pervasive in capital markets.
194
  One level of disclosure applies to the investment product – for 
example, a specific mutual fund, the stock of a particular company, or a certificate of deposit – that the 
investor purchases.  All retail investors, regardless of the type of account in which they hold assets, 
arguably require access to basic information about investment products, including the risk profiles, fees, 
and returns associated with those investments.
195
  Second, the investors arguably require access to 
information that would enable them to understand the terms of the accounts that will hold the 
investments.  For generalized investment accounts that may be a brokerage account (A$) or a bank 
account (B$).  For retirement-specific accounts, terms of 401(k) plans are set by an employer (for ER$) or 
a financial services firm will have set terms of a product unrelated to employment such as an IRA (for 
IR$). 
 
1. Disclosure Regarding Investment Products 
 
Responsibility for implementing disclosure requirements for investment products in the US has 
been fragmented both within the realm of generalized investment accounts, a fragmentation the Blueprint 
recognizes,
196
 and between those accounts and retirement-specific accounts as well as between employer-
sponsored retirement-specific accounts (such as 401ks) and individually-established retirement-specific 
accounts (such as IRAs), fragmentations the Blueprint does not explicitly recognize.  The Blueprint is 
specific in establishing a goal to consolidate responsibility for disclosure requirements for generalized 
investment accounts.  However, it is not clear whether it intends that consolidation to include 
responsibility for the disclosure requirements over retirement-specific accounts.  Such a consolidation 
would represent a significant departure over the current approach. 
Mutual funds provide the best example of the current divergence in regulatory responsibility and 
substance.  As noted above, in 2007 twenty-four percent of mutual fund investments were held in a DC 
retirement-specific account.
197
  The SEC has primary responsibility for the regulation of mutual funds, 
with its powers over mutual funds derived from the Investment Company Act.
198
   In 1998 the SEC 
adopted a simplified form of disclosure for use by mutual funds, the profile prospectus or fund profile, 
which the SEC hoped would make basic information about specific mutual funds more accessible to 
investors.
199
  That simplified disclosure was available to mutual funds purchased through generalized 
investment accounts.  In addition, the SEC announced when it permitted the simplified disclosure that it 
expected information in that format to be particularly useful to individuals saving in retirement-specific 
accounts.
200
  The result, however, has been characterized as “an abysmal failure . . . in the retirement plan 
market.”
201
  That lack of success probably occurred, at least in part, because EBSA never explicitly 
approved the profile prospectus for use in the most popular types of employer-sponsored retirement-
specific accounts, those where employers delegate investment choice and responsibility to their 
employees.
202
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In November 2007 the SEC began another effort to simplify mutual fund disclosures, again with 
the hope of making disclosures more useful to investors.  This time the SEC decided in favor of 
implementing what it refers to as short-form prospectuses.  This shorter, more focused, version of the full 
prospectus would meet the securities law requirement that a prospectus be delivered prior to or 
contemporaneous with a mutual fund investment.
 203
 The SEC made clear, by permitting specific 
legending that would refer to DC retirement-specific accounts,
204
 that it hoped the short-form 
prospectuses would be used to inform investors who considered buying mutual funds in those accounts.  
That action put the ball in EBSA‟s court to approve, ignore, or modify the use of short form prospectuses 
in DC retirement-specific accounts. 
In July 2008, EBSA responded when it issued proposed regulations, which address a variety of 
disclosure issues that had been simmering for some time.  Those proposed regulations eliminate the 
former requirement that investors who purchase mutual funds through retirement-specific accounts 
receive a prospectus prior to making the investment, a requirement that was widely ignored.
205
   However, 
rather than requiring delivery of the short-form prospectus developed by the SEC as is necessary for 
generalized investment accounts, the proposed regulations would require a prospectus to be supplied only 
when a retirement-specific account investor requests one.
206
  As part of this prospectus-on-request 
requirement, the EBSA-proposed regulation states that a prospectus “(or any short form or summary 
prospectus, the form of which has been approved by the [SEC])”
207
 must be provided. This implies that 
that a short-form prospectus would only need to be provided to an investor who specifically requests the 
short-form.   
It appears, then, that the SEC and EBSA disagree about the value of a simplified mutual fund 
disclosure document.  The SEC requires disclosure for all mutual fund sales.  EBSA requires disclosure 
only if the investor requests a prospectus.  As a result, if the individual from our earlier example, Saver, 
purchases mutual funds though a standard brokerage account or directly from a mutual fund, SEC 
guidance requires that Saver receive a short-form prospectus.  If Saver buys the same mutual fund 
through a retirement-specific account, Saver will not automatically receive a prospectus.  Rather, Saver 
has the right to request a prospectus or short-form prospectus, assuming, of course, that Saver knows to 
make the request and understands the difference between a full prospectus and a short-form prospectus.   
From a coordination standpoint, the proposed EBSA regulations are an improvement over past 
practice in that the proposed regulations explicitly accept forms of prospectus that are approved by the 
SEC.  It has, however, taken 10 years from the implementation of the SEC‟s fund profile to get to the 
point where EBSA formally accepts through regulation an SEC summary form of prospectus.
208
  And, 
differences in delivery requirements remain.  Perhaps these differences in prospectus delivery 
requirements between retirement-specific and generalized investment accounts serve an important policy 
function.  However, what that policy might be is not clear on the face of the regulations or in statements 
by the regulators.  Nor, does the difference in requirements between the two types of accounts appear to 
be the product of coordination and agreement between the SEC and EBSA.   
The difference in prospectus delivery requirements is only one recent example of the differences 
between disclosure requirements in investor accounts regulated by EBSA as compared to those regulated 
by the SEC.  EBSA requires that information about investment options be presented in a particular, 
                                                 
203 Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, 72 
Fed. Reg. 67790, 67815 (proposed Nov. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 230, 232, 239, and 274). 
204 72 Fed. Reg. at 67815. 
205 Pete Swisher, Death to the Prospectus Requirement!  The New 401(k) Participant Disclosure Rules, 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.401khelpcenter.com/pdf/Death_to_the_Prospectus_Requirement.pdf. 
206 Fiduciary Regulation for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans, 73 Fed. Reg. 43014, 43040 (proposed 
July 23, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550.404a-5(d)(4)(i)). 
207 Id. 
208 EBSA had technically permitted the use of the most recent profile prospectus, however, the consensus of lawyers was to 
advise plan fiduciaries not to rely on dissemination of profile prospectuses.  See Fiduciary Guidance Counsel (Mar. 2008) (“Even 
if a retirement plan‟s fiduciary is completely confident that the profile prospectus is the “most recent prospectus”, a cautious 






  As explained above, the amount and disclosure of investment account fees has troubled 
policy makers in the UK and Australia as well as the US.  In 2008 EBSA issued proposed regulations 
detailing new account fee disclosure requirements in retirement-specific accounts.
210
  At the same time, 
but not necessarily in tandem, the SEC has been working on regulation of account fee disclosure in 
generalized investment accounts.
211
  The IRS has not revised its regulation of IRA reporting for fee 
disclosures.
212
  Similarly, disclosures of conflicts of interest by investment advisors and other advisor 
regulation differ depending on whether the account under advisement is an employer-sponsored 
retirement-specific account or a generalized investment account.
213
   
These examples of tensions between the disclosure requirements imposed by securities law on the 
marketing and sale of investments on the one hand and the disclosures imposed by ERISA are not 
intended to be all inclusive.
214
  Instead, the point is that the fragmentation of responsibility for setting 
disclosure standards has led to inconsistencies and likely to inefficiencies.  If the restructuring of financial 
services regulation results in the formation of a new business conduct regulator then careful attention 
should be given to the way authority for disclosure and other regulation related to the sale and purchase of 
investment products is divided or coordinated between that regulator and EBSA. 
 
2.  Disclosure Regarding Investment Assets 
 
Differences in regulators and in substantive regulation also occur at the level of disclosure of the 
account terms (as compared to disclosure of the terms of the investment product).  Although regulatory 
responsibility for setting the terms of employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts – terms that are 
found in the benefit plan established by employers – is divided between the IRS and EBSA, EBSA has 
authority over the disclosure of those plan terms.  Those disclosures have not tended to be particularly 
problematic either from the standpoint of their substantive content or in regulatory overlap.  
Substantively, the employee investors must receive information on the terms governing the accounts, such 
as how much they can save in these plans, whether the employer makes any contributions, whether 
account holders have access to the funds prior to retirement or other separation, and process-related 
concerns such as how account holders change investments or elect to receive their funds when the plan 
distributes their account assets.  Certainly, errors and even malfeasance may occur in making these 
disclosures,
215
 but there are no indications of widespread systemic problems.  An exception has been the 
recent attention, and litigation, over disclosure of account-level fees.  EBSA has addressed that fee 
reporting in the proposed regulations on fee disclosure, which are discussed above.
216
   
In the realm of generalized investment accounts, regulatory responsibility for oversight of 
disclosure of the account terms is splintered as it is with respect to products disclosure.
217
  It appears that 
the Blueprint would also consolidate regulatory authority over this level of disclosure under the authority 
of the new business conduct regulator.
218
  The Blueprint defines one of the key roles of the business 
conduct regulator as being the development of “adequate disclosures for all types of financial products 
                                                 
209 See Fiduciary Regulation for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans, 73 Fed. Reg. 43014, 43040 
(proposed July 23, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550.404a-5(d)(4)(i)). 
210 73 Fed. Reg. 43014. 
211 72 Fed. Reg. 67790. 
212
See Treas. Reg. 1.408-6 (requiring reporting of sales fees and charges against IRA accounts).  
213 See supra text accompanying note 147. 
214
 For example see supra text accompany notes 137-39 for discussion of overlapping claims regarding employer 
stock. 
215 See, e.g. Pell v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,  539 F.3d 292; (3rd Cir. 2008) (finding miscalculations of benefits 
entitlement);  Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Emples. of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 334 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir. 
2003) (reinstating claim for benefits based on inconsistent disclosures).  
216 See supra text accompanying notes 205-07. 
217 See Swisher, supra note 205, at 2. 






  It specifically recognizes the wide dispersion of existing authority over disclosures and 
indicates that consolidation of the regulatory oversight could increase the uniformity in disclosure 
approaches.
220
  This would have the benefit of rationalizing those disclosures so that investors can 
compare types of accounts as well as types of investment products.   
 
B.  “Business Practices” and Retirement-specific Accounts 
 
In addition to authority over disclosure standards, the Blueprint would grant the business conduct 
regulator oversight responsibility for the substantive conduct of business practices.  This responsibility 
would include regulation of the sales and marketing of financial products. Presumably, this authority also 
would extend to account maintenance and administration. Currently, as is true of the regulation of 
disclosure, that authority is splintered among a variety of regulators depending on the particular financial 
product in question.  The stated goal of consolidation of regulatory authority over the business practices 
of financial institutions is, as with other areas of consolidation, “greater consistency.”
221
   
EBSA currently has regulatory responsibility over all fiduciary activities connected with 
retirement-specific accounts and ERISA‟s definition of fiduciary is unusually broad.  Still, competitive 
sales and marketing of investment products directly to investors in employer-sponsored retirement-
specific accounts has not been extensive in the US.  Certainly, the US has not experienced widespread 
problems of the type that occurred in the UK in the misselling scandal.  Instead, sales and marketing of 
investment products has typically focused on the employers that sponsor DC plans because those 
employers choose the investment options that are made available to the individual employees.  Employers 
typically select a limited menu of mutual funds from one or a small number of fund families.  Thus, the 
marketing competition among financial services firms occurs in the environment of the employer‟s 
decision making. In recently proposed regulations, EBSA made clear that it believes that employers‟ 
selection and ongoing monitoring of investment products constitutes a fiduciary function and is within 
EBSA‟s oversight responsibility.
222
  Employers have argued that their role in selecting an investment 




Another subset of business practice concerns, however, occurs in the administration of 
retirement-specific accounts.  The potential for problems varies depending on an assortment of factors 
such as the type of entities responsible for processing transactions and the type of investment.   It appears 
that the business practices regulator would receive authority over all of these activities for generalized 
investment accounts.  Currently, EBSA has regulatory responsibility and ERISA governs these activities 
in retirement-specific accounts.  Here again, the fragmented regulatory approach produces outcomes 
dependent on whether investments are made in retirement-specific accounts or in generalized investment 
accounts. 
Consider, for example, a situation where our hypothetical investor, Saver, directs the proper 
entity to liquidate one investment product and move the assets into another product.  Assume the entity 
negligently or intentionally fails to follow Saver‟s direction, creating a loss of $150,000 to Saver.
224
  If 
this were to occur in a standard brokerage account, currently Saver would pursue a claim through the 
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securities industry self-regulatory organization, FINRA, which sponsors mediation and arbitration 
programs to address such disputes.  The SEC has oversight over FINRA and could pursue widespread 
problems using its own authority.  It appears that self-regulatory organizations such as FINRA would 
continue to play a role in a reformed financial services regulatory framework and would be overseen by 
the business practices regulator.  In comparison, the investor‟s ERISA claim is a complicated one.  Until 
2008 there was a question of whether an investor had any rights to bring a fiduciary breach claim for such 
losses to the retirement-specific account.  The Supreme Court resolved that question in the affirmative.
225
  
The fiduciary standards and remedies, however, remain governed by ERISA and are under the regulatory 
jurisdiction of EBSA.
226
 As a result, the investor‟s recovery to the plan account may be limited and there 





C. Principles for Rationalizing Regulation of Retirement-Specific Accounts 
 
The movement to DC retirement-specific accounts and the resulting tensions in the regulation of 
those accounts as compared to generalized investment accounts means that decisions on allocation of 
regulatory authority and substantive regulation over retirement-specific accounts must be made as part of 
any broad reform of the US system of oversight of the financial services sector.  To ignore that sector of 
the investment universe would be to fail to acknowledge the importance of those assets in the broader 
system of investment and financial services and to leave their regulation in the ERISA framework, which 
was devised in a very different financial and plan ear and results in regulatory overlap.  However, to 
sweep the regulation of retirement-specific accounts wholly into a reformed financial services regulatory 
system as though those accounts are for all purposes the equivalent of other intermediated retail 
investments would be to ignore the specialized dimensions of those accounts.  As it moves forward, two 
basic principles can help guide reform in a way that supports the accumulation of retirement wealth.  
Inherent tension exists, however, between those basic principles, which will require reformers to balance 
two competing values. 
 
1.  Coordination 
 
Coordination is one guidepost that encompasses principles important to efficient and effective 
regulatory oversight.  For example, coordination of the reporting and disclosure regulations that push 
investment performance information to retail investors, whether those investors hold assets in retirement-
specific accounts or in generalized-investment accounts, enhances efficiency for both financial services 
firms and investors.  Coordinated requirements allow firms to minimize costs associated with either 
complying directly with multiple disclosure regimes or trying to ensure that a single set of disclosures 
meets the minimum standards of each applicable set of requirements.  For investors, coordination 
minimizes confusion that may result from receiving significantly different communications for different 
categories of investment accounts.  Other areas where coordination should reduce inefficiencies include 
communications regarding purchases, fees, marketing, and methods of resolutionfor some claims. 
Coordination can minimize the costs of multiple agencies devoting resources to identical issues.  
It also can reduce the number of touch points that a financial services firm has with regulators.  
Development of regulatory expertise is also supported by consolidation of regulatory function.  For 
example, a regulator can leverage its experience in dealing with risk mitigation across similar products 
and types of investors.  Consider the risks associated with failing to credit an account for an investment.   
Those risks are substantially similar in an investment account regardless of whether it is a DC retirement-
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specific account or a generalized investment account.  In an employer-sponsored account, the employer 
must ensure that its contributions and any employee contributions are properly forwarded to the 
appropriate plan agent.  The result is that there is some additional risk at that level in employer-sponsored 
plans.  But, otherwise, the accounts share similar characteristics.  There is no reason to believe that 
mechanisms intended to ensure recognition of investment deposits or execution of investment instructions 
are substantially different in the context of retirement-specific accounts than they are with respect to other 
investment products.   
Coordination of investment advice may provide similar benefits.  A single regulator provides one 
touch point or, if regulation continues to be split between federal and state securities regulators, at one 
type of touch point.  For investors, this may enable more wholistic advice as investment advice may be 
more likely to be provided across all of an investor‟s assets rather than isolating employer-related 
retirement specific account holdings. 
Coordination should minimize the opportunity for financial services firms to inappropriately 
exploit regulatory differences between types of accounts.  For example, if fees are capped or required to 
be disclosed in different ways in one set of accounts, that may permit an opportunistic financial services 
firm to inappropriately exploit the differences by offering different financial products in those accounts as 
compared to other accounts.  In some instances, different product terms may be appropriate because of 
account sizes, numbers, and other efficiencies.  A regulator that has authority over the products regardless 
of the wrapper holding the products may be best placed to ensure informed regulatory distinctions.   
Another perspective on coordination, though, is to look at coordination across the employer and 
employee relationship.   Here, the touch points that may matter are the touch points of an employer when 
dealing with workplace regulators, or the touch points that an employee faces when trying to resolve 
work-related compensation disputes.  The consequences for employers and employees may increase the 
value of coordination across the workplace regulators. 
It is even less clear at the level of account disclosure than it is at the level of investment product 
disclosure whether EBSA‟s current role should be assigned to or coordinated with a business conduct 
regulator as part of the redistribution of responsibility for financial services regulation.   
   
 
2.  Specialization 
 
As important as coordination is, the value gained through coordination may not outweigh the 
alternative of specialized, more focused regulation.  A counter force to the values associated with 
coordination can be found within the underlying policies reflected in tax incentives, which are intended to 
increase the number of Americans who save for their retirement and how much they save.  In the past, for 
example, the goal of increasing long term savings has resulted in restrictions on the early withdrawal of 
retirement-specific account assets.  On the other hand, the policy that the tax incentive is intended to 
benefit the saver‟s retirement, not the saver‟s estate, has led to minimum distribution requirements to 
reduce the use of those accounts as estate accumulation devices.  These retirement-specific account 
requirements tend to operate at the plan level rather than at the investment level.  As such, they are part of 
the set of rules that wraps around retirement-specific accounts and governs the eligibility of those 
accounts for tax-favored treatment. 
Some commentators have argued that the tax support and policy goals inherent in retirement 
accounts mean it is appropriate for those accounts to be treated more paternalistically from a regulatory 
perspective than non retirement-specific accounts are treated.
228
  Similarly, as discussed above, Professors 
Nobles and Black argue that one factor in the misselling scandal in the UK was the failure of the relevant 
regulators, all of which had responsibility for aspects of investments and financial services firms, to focus 
on the unique issues associated with personal pensions.
229
  The gist of this concern is that regulators 
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without particular expertise in the nuances of retirement-specific accounts will miss risks that are specific 
to those accounts and to the goal of building wealth for retirement.   
On a related front, research by behavioral economists shows that establishing retirement-specific 
accounts in which employees participate by default are effective in increasing savings in those accounts.  
For example, automatically enrolling new employees in these accounts, automatically deducting 
contributions to the accounts from their wages, and investing the assets in particular financial products all 
can positively affect the accumulation of retirement assets.
230
   In 2006 Congress amended ERISA to 
remove barriers to the use of these types of default provisions and to encourage their implementation.
231
  
Automatic participation and investment account terms do not have a clear parallel in generalized 
investment accounts.  In addition, whether employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts incorporate 
the use of those mechanisms is a decision made by employers. Thus, there may be liitle coordination in 
this area to be gained by consolidating the regulation under a consumer protection regulator and 
specialization gains to be had by continuing to assign the regulatory authority to EBSA  
More generally, the US system of retirement wealth accumulation is so fragile that it is important 
that regulatory reform, as it is put in that well-worn phrase, do no harm. The policy ramifications, which 
are unique to retirement-specific accounts, and relational considerations, may point to EBSA as the 
regulator of choice, particularly at the level of plan terms. Through their regulation of benefit plans, 
EBSA and the IRS share responsibility for setting the terms of retirement-specific accounts.  Arguably, 
given EBSA‟s expertise in allowable plan terms it would be best positioned to set disclosure requirements 
for those terms.    
 
3.  Comparative Experience 
 
Experience in the UK and Australia illustrates the difficulty in achieving an optimal division of 
regulatory authority over retirement-specific accounts.  Each country addressed the allocation of 
regulatory authority within the context of its approach to financial services regulation.  The UK‟s single 
regulator model, which assigns the FSA authority over financial services and products currently 
accommodates the existence of TPR, which has authority to advise and oversee employers that sponsor of 
work-based pension plans and the trustees of those plans.  Australia‟s objective‟s-based system assigns 
regulatory authority in a way closest to that proposed by the Blueprint, so that a single regulator (APRA) 
has responsibility for all prudential regulation and another has responsibility for consumer protection 
(ASIC).  However, both the UK and Australia have struggled with concerns of inefficiencies due to 
overlapping regulatory authority and gaps in oversight. 
In early 2007, the UK commissioned an external study of its pension regulatory system.
232
   A 
large part of the study‟s mandate was to review the allocation of authority among regulators to ensure 
efficiency and to identify “conflicts of interest, gaps or unhelpful overlaps in functions.”
233
  The review 
considered the possibility of merging the TPR into the FSA even though the TPR had been in existence 
only two years at the time of the review.
234
  Ultimately the study recommended increased efforts intended 
to maximize coordination between the TPR and FSA.
235
  It also recommended continued observance of 
the boundaries between the two entities, recognizing that as financial products and regulatory changes 
affect retirement-specific accounts, it would be important to reevaluate the division of regulatory 
                                                 
230 Choi, James J., et al. For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior Working Paper No. 8651. 
National Bureau of Economic Research  (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,  Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 256-
57 (2006).  
231 Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 902, adding 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(k)(13), 401(m)(12), & 414(w). 
232 Paul Thornton, A Review of Pensions Institutions:  An Independent Report to the Department for Work and Pensions 9 (June 
2007), available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/pensionsreform/pdfs/InstitutionalReviewFinalreport180507.pdf 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 37. 






  That study, however, did not put an end to calls from the financial services firms to merge 
the FSA and TPR.
237
   
Australia has undertaken similar reviews, which have resulted in recommendations intended to 
decrease redundant regulation.  In June 2006, the parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services undertook a study of a variety of pension-related issues, including a benchmarking of 
Australia‟s practices against those of other nations and the relevance of APRA‟s standards.
238
  A research 
paper written at the request of the Parliamentary Joint Committee focused on benchmarking and 
addressed regulatory overlaps.
239
  That report cited concerns resulting from insufficient cooperation and 
coordination between APRA and ASIC.
240
  The Parliamentary Joint Committee ultimately recommended 
a report be undertaken on “the issue of overlapping, inconsistent and conflicting requirements of 
superannuation funds from a number of regulators.”
241
  To date there is no record of such a study. 
For disclosure matters, the UK and Australia have generally attempted to resolve the tension 
between consistency and specialized workplace expertise in favor of consistency, with Australia moving 
further than the UK in this direction.  Both countries have increasingly consolidated authority for 
regulation of disclosure to investors.  In the UK, the FSA has responsibility for ensuring that investors 
understand financial products and markets but TPR retains some role in disclosures during the 
accumulation phase of a workplace-related retirement-specific account.
242
  In Australia, ASIC regulates 
sales practices and related disclosures by the financial services sector to investors regardless of whether 
the investments are held in retirement-specific accounts or in generalized investment accounts.
243
  One 
significant difference, though, among the US, UK and Australian pension systems is the amount of 
discretion that employers have over plan terms.  Australia, which mandates a minimum employer 
contribution level, gives employers the least discretion.  The US, which does not require any employer to 
offer either a DB or DC pension plan, gives employers the most discretion.  That increased discretion may 
affect the balance between the importance of consistency and specialized workplace expertise in 
assigning regulatory authority.  
 Similarly, the UK and Australia have consolidated regulatory authority over the business 
practices of financial services firms using the same principles each country used for assignment of 
regulatory oversight of disclosure.  In the UK, the FSA has regulatory responsibility for the 
administration of investment accounts, including retirement-specific accounts.
244
  TPR, however, retains 
some authority over employment-based pensions because of its focus on the employer‟s role in pension 
provision.  
The UK consolidation of authority extends to complaint resolution. Investors make their 
complaints about the administration of investments to the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS).  
According to the MOU between the FOS and the PO, “FOS deals with complaints and disputes which 
predominantly concern the sale and/or marketing of both personal and occupational pensions.”
245
  
Compare the US, where FINRA‟s dispute resolution system applies to complaints against broker-dealers 
associated with generalized investment accounts and complaints about problems such as execution of 
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buy/sell orders in employer-sponsored retirement-specific accounts are brought as lawsuits in the federal 
court system. 
 Australia confers regulatory authority over the administration of all individualized investment 
accounts on the ASIC.  This is part of ASIC‟s very broad authority, which extends over all corporate 
entities in Australia including those entities involved in the provision of products and services to investors 
in retirement-specific accounts.  ASIC‟s responsibilities include prevention of “misleading or deceptive 
and unconscionable conduct in relation to [retirement investment] products and advice.”
246
  Australia also 
has established a system of complaint resolution that is unique to benefit related disputes. 
As noted above, the level of employer intermediation in retirement-specific accounts 
distinguishes the US approach from the situation in Australia   Both the UK and US have traditions of 
pension programs being embedded in the workplace.  In that context the employer‟s retirement-specific 
account actions are a dimension of the employer-employee relationship.  If the sponsorship of those plans 
becomes too onerous, in a system of voluntary plan sponsorship employers may shift away from DC 
plans or stop sponsoring plans that contain retirement accounts.   Most commentators think that the 
increase in regulation of DB plans was a factor in the decrease in sponsorship of DB plans.
247
  Unless, 
reform of regulation of financial services firms is coupled with reform of the US‟s voluntary DC 
system,
248
 the risk of decreased employer sponsorship must be considered as reform moves forward.  The 
amount of employer intermediation, however, is much higher in DB retirement-specific plans, where the 
employer makes investment and other risk-related decisions than in DC retirement-specific account plans 
where those decisions are made by employees.
249
 
Finally workplace-based retirement-specific account schemes in the US have traditionally been 
used by employers as workplace management tools.  In industries where workforce stability was 
important, DB plans were implemented to increase employee retention.  When workforce reductions were 
required, those same DB plans could provide early retirement programs to ease the impact on employees 
of the reduction in force.  DC retirement-specific accounts provide fewer workplace management tools 
because they are transferrable among employers and the benefits are not back loaded in the way DB 
benefits typically are.  However, employers still may view those plans as ways to differentiate themselves 
and attract workers, enhancing their willingness to sponsor such plans.  Those circumstances increase the 
value of specialization by a workplace regulator, such as EBSA, particularly at the account level as 
opposed to the level of investment products. 
 
 
VI.    Conclusion 
 
The distress in US financial markets, bankruptcies of premier financial services firms, and the 
congressional rescue packages will reinforce calls for reform of the regulatory framework for the financial 
services industry.  The Treasury Department presented a thoughtful and reasonably comprehensive multi-
step plan in its Blueprint.  Although reform will not be enacted without lengthy debate over the input of 
many thoughtful proposals, the Blueprint provides a framework to begin the discussion of how pension 
policy and regulation interacts with regulation of the financial services industry.  It is essential that as the 
debate on regulatory reform moves forward policy makers recognize the symbiotic relationship among 
these areas. 
Increasingly, Americans rely on DC retirement-specific accounts, such as 401k accounts, to 
accumulate assets for retirement.  Although they receive favorable tax treatment, those accounts share 
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many similarities with investment accounts that are not specific to retirement savings, such as brokerage 
accounts and bank savings accounts.  In each type of account, the individual investor is likely to decide 
whether to save at all and what investments to make.  In each type of account, the individual investor 
probably will have a variety of opportunities to access the account assets. This is a dramatic difference 
from the past, when DB retirement plans provided a monthly pension check and were viewed as very 
different from generic investment accounts. 
Although to individual investors, investment accounts of different types, including retirement-
specific accounts, are becoming increasingly similar, regulation continues to differentiate among the types 
of accounts.   The Blueprint does not explicitly address the regulatory distinctions currently drawn among 
the various types of accounts and it is impossible to predict how any final reform package will treat 
retirement-specific account regulation.  However, one often discussed reform principle is the 
consolidation of authority necessary to achieve a specific goal, such as investor protection.  The belief is 
that consolidation would enhance efficiencies, prevent financial products from exploiting regulatory gaps 
and inconsistencies, and make it easier for investors to compare financial products.   
Careful consolidation, though, must be given to any reform of regulation over retirement-specific 
accounts.  Assets held in retirement-specific accounts in the US are a large portion of the total assets 
under investment in the US.  At the same time it is questionable whether those assets will be sufficient to 
provide retirement security to many Americans. Certainly, DC retirement-specific accounts suffered 
severe losses during the 2008 economic downturn.  It is fair to ask whether proposed reform would better 
protect retirement-specific accounts in a future downturn.  It also is necessary to recognize the 
intermediary role played by employers and tax policy.  
The experience of Australia and the UK illustrates just how difficult these decisions are.  Each 
country took a different path to the assignment of regulatory authority over retirement accounts and the 
implementation of financial industry participants.  Both countries continue to struggle with concerns over 
regulatory overlaps and regulatory gaps.  And, both confront the question of adequacy of retirement assets 
especially after the 2008 market declines. 
There can be no doubt, though, that the fates of capital markets and retirement wealth are 
intertwined.  As the US moves forward with regulatory reform over the financial services industry, the 
country should not miss this opportunity to ensure that the regulatory structure best supports both the 
capital markets and working Americans who hope for a financially secure retirement. 
